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ALL DRESSED UP WITH NO PLACE TO GO:
GENDER BIAS IN OKLAHOMA FEDERAL
COURT DRESS CODES
Skirt and pants stand juxtaposed as the Western world's symbolic
Great Divide.
- Susan Brownmiller'
As long as the male-dominant power paradigm of law remains un-
challenged, the basic social hierarchy will not change. The struggle
for sexual equality can be successful only if it challenges, rather than
reifies, the male paradigm of law.
- Janet Rifkin2
I. INTRODUCTION
Dress codes may seem trivial and unmeritorious of federal court
time and serious analysis, but "objectification, in fact and in conse-
quence, is never trivial."'3 Attire conveys stature, wealth, education,
respect, and social status. All of which are attributes that women have
historically been unable to attain in their own right, and have only
occasionally attained through vicarious association with their fathers
and husbands.4 For this reason, it is necessary that a woman be al-
lowed to enter the work place dressed in a manner that reveals "pro-
fessionalism" regardless of whether it also portrays "femininity."
1. SUsAN BROWNMILLER, FEmINNrrY 82 (Ballantine Books 1985) (1984).
2. Janet Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L. 83, 95
(1980).
3. Mary Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV.
WOMEN'S LJ. 73 (1982) (quoting ANDREA DWORKiN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING Wo-
MEN 115 (1981)).
4. SIorN DE BEAuVOIR, THE SECOND SEx 588-89 (Vintage Books 1974) (1949). See also,
GLORIA STEINEM, OUTRAGEOUS Acts AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS 116-17 (1983).
The pain of looking back at wasted, imitative years is enormous. Trying to write like
men. Valuing myself and other women according to the degree of our acceptance by
men - socially, in politics, and in our professions. It's as painful as it is now to hear two
grown-up female human beings competing with each other on the basis of their hus-
band's status, like servants whose identity rests on the wealth or accomplishments of
their employers. And this lack of esteem that makes us put each other down is still the
major enemy of sisterhood. Women who are conforming to society's expectations view
the nonconformists with justifiable alarm. Those noisy, unfeminine, women, they say to
themselves. They will only make trouble for us all. Women who are quietly noncon-
forming, hoping nobody will notice, are even more alarmed because they have more to
1
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Women who are obligated to dress in a manner that accentuates their
"femininity" instead of their "professionalism" are revisited by nega-
tive stereotypes and pigeonholed in the very category that, in the pur-
suit of a successful career, it is crucial they leave.- Ultimately,
feminizing a woman's appearance through dress codes reinforces a
woman's subordinate status in society and inhibits her from engender-
ing the confidence and respect she deserves from peers, clients, and
employers.
The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force reported, "[A]ithough
'dress codes' may be regarded simply as a matter of routine business
policy... gender specific dress codes are perceived by some women as
a way of setting them apart from their male colleagues."7 It went on
to say, "[V]iewed independently, dress codes that prohibit women
from wearing pants... may appear to be an unlikely subject for policy
debate. But viewed as one aspect of a professional environment that a
sizeable fraction of... female practitioners view as hostile... gender-
specific dress codes may need to be accorded greater significance."'8
Indeed, a woman's attire is significant, and should not be underesti-
mated when it is crucial to her economic and social welfare that she be
regarded as a credible professional. Unfortunately, many task forces
have concluded that women have been "'denied credibility' in courts
and faced 'a judiciary underinformed about matters integral to many
women's welfare'." 9
Specifically, this comment deals with the dress codes in each of
the three Oklahoma Federal District Courts. 10 While each dress code
is different, all three treat women patronizingly and place them in an
lose. And that makes sense, too. The status quo protects itself by punishing all chal-
lengers, especially women whose rebellion strikes at the most fundamental social or-
ganization: the sex roles that convince half the population that its identity depends on
being first in work or in war, and the other half that it must serve as docile, unpaid, or
underpaid labor.
Id.
5. See Whisner, supra note 3, at 73-78. See also JOHN T. MOLLOY, THE WOMAN'S DRESS
FOR Succnss BOOK 21 (1977) (providing that "[d]espite the rhetoric of the feminist movement,
many women, including businesswomen, continue to view themselves as sex objects. Sexuality is
certainly an important part of our lives. But when sexuality is a factor in choosing business wear,
it harms a woman's career").
6. Id. See also Laura Mansnerus, Why Women are Leaving the Law, WORKINO WOMAN,
Apr. 1993, at 64.
7. The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force: The Effects of Gender in
the Federal Courts, 67 S. CAL L. Rnv. 727, 852 (1994).
8. Id. at 852.
9. Id. at 733-34.
10. Specifically, the three Oklahoma Federal District Courts include the Northern District
Federal Court, the Western District Federal Court, and the Eastern District Federal Court.
[Vol. 30:395
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inferior context and position.11 In this sense, the federal judiciary is
lending its legitimacy to women's subordinate position in society by
characterizing them, literally dressing them, as "females" first and
"professionals" second. This indicates women are "second best" in a
male dominated profession.12
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Law, in mythology, culture, and philosophy, is the ultimate sym-
bol of masculine authority and patriarchal society. 3 Until recently,
women have been excluded from the courts and the legal system, as
the law was viewed to be the exclusive dominion of men.14 The adver-
sarial system, upon which the American system is based, is character-
istically associated with the male attributes of being battle-hardened,
shrewd, authoritative, and tough-minded. 5 Women, on the other
hand, have historically been viewed as compassionate, selfless, gentle,
moral, and pure. 6
In 1875, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the law was
unfit for the female character.' 7 To expose women to the brutal, re-
pulsive, and obscene events of courtroom life would shock man's rev-
erence for womanhood and relax the public's sense of decency.' 8 That
same sentiment was shared by the famous litigator Clarence Darrow,
11. See discussion infra part V.
12. If men are dominant in the law, and women inferior, then to be dressed "womanly" is to
be distinguished as second best. See Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Juris-
diction, And The Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682 (1991).
From 1982 until 1990, these task forces on gender bias in the courts were exclusively the
domain of state courts. The federal courts (either acting circuit by circuit or as a whole
by action of the Judicial Conference of the United States) neither took the lead nor
followed suit in forming committees to ask questions about the interaction between
gender and the federal court system. The question of what role, if any, the federal
courts as an institution might take in considering the effects of gender has come to the
fore recently because of actions by Congress and by the federal judiciary.
In 1988, Congress created a specially chartered committee, empowered to provide
a comprehensive overview of the federal judicial system. That group, the Federal
Courts Study Committee (FCSC), with fifteen members appointed by the Chief Justice,
included several federal judges; its charge was to think about the future of the federal
courts. Many individuals and organizations saw the FCSC as having the potential to
make recommendations about how gender affects decisionmaking, employment, and
work in the federal courts. The FCSC thus heard and received testimony-including
many requests that the federal courts, like the state courts, convene gender bias task
forces and begin other programs on gender bias.
Id. at 1685-86.
13. Rifkin, supra note 2, at 92.
14. Rifkin, supra note 2, at 83-84.
15. Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546, 1547 (1991).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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who stated to a group of women lawyers, "You can't be shining lights
at the bar because you are too kind. You can never be corporation
lawyers because you are not cold-blooded. You have not a high grade
of intellect. I doubt you can ever make a living."'" Indeed, when
Myra Bradwell,2 ° who has been dubbed "America's first woman law-
yer,"'" asked the Supreme Court for permission to practice law, Jus-
tice Bradley declined, stating, "The natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many
of the occupations of civil life."22
In spite of the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, women's
rights and status were left virtually unchanged.'a The strictures of the
Bill of Rights were limited to the federal government, and the states
were still free to pass legislation that was primarily drawn from the
English common law. Thus, women gained few property or contrac-
tual rights from the ratification 4.2  Change was slow even with the pas-
sage of the Fourteenth Amendment.' In fact, for over 100 years, the
Supreme Court turned away equal protection challenges to unequal
treatment of women and men.26 Only in 1971, seven years after the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the passage of Title VII,27 did the Court
decide that such treatment was constitutionally suspect.2
19. Id. at 1548. See also GERMAINE GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH 111-12 (Bantam Books
1972) (1970).
It is true that women often refuse to argue logically. In many cases they simply do not
know how to, and men may dazzle them with a little pompous sophistry. In some cases
they are intimidated and upset before rationalization begins. But it is also true that in
most situations logic is simply rationalization of an infralogical aim. women know this;
even the best educated of them know that arguments with their menfolk are disguised
realpolitik. It is not a contest of mental agility with the right as the victor's spoils, but a
contest of wills. The rules of logical discourse are no more relevant than the Marquess
of Queensberry's are to a pub brawl. Female hardheadedness rejects the misguided
masculine notion that men are rational animals. Male logic can only deal with simple
issues: women, because they are passive and condemned to observe and react rather
than initiate, are more aware of complexity. Men have been forced to suppress their
receptivity, in the interests of domination.
Id.
20. Myra Bradwell (1831-1894).
21. JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA'S FrosT WOMAN LAWYER, THE BIOGRAPHY OF MYRA
BRADwELL 1 (1993).
22. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
23. O'Connor, supra note 15, at 1549.
24. O'Connor, supra note 15, at 1549.
25. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward A Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV.
487, 488 (1981).
26. Id.
27. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was meant to prohibit employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1988).
28. MacKinnon, supra note 25, at 488.
4
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Reed v. Reed,29 the landmark case which rejected the automatic
male preference for estate administrators, paved the way for future
gender neutral legislation. 30  Sandra Day O'Connor, the first female
Supreme Court Justice,31 stated that the Reed decision "signaled a
dramatic change in the Court's approach to the myth of the 'True Wo-
man."' 32 The "true woman" perception was based upon the historical
stereotypical view as to the proper role and experience for a woman.
In Justice O'Connor's opinion, woman's current progress is due "in
large part to the explosion of the myth of the 'True Woman' through
efforts of real women and the insights of real men. Released from
these prejudices, women have proved they can do a 'man's' job. 33
Certainly, this progress can be exemplified by the efforts of real
people like Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the first di-
rector of the Women's Rights Project of the ACLU,34 and Melvin
Wulf, a former director of the ACLU.3" Together, Justice Ginsburg
and Wulf wrote the Reed brief that resulted in an unanimous Supreme
29. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
30. See generally id. Reed was the first case that found a state law that discriminated against
women to be unconstitutional, and hence, illegal.
31. Sandra Day O'Connor was appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1981.
32. O'Connor, supra note 15, at 1551.
33. O'Connor, supra note 15, at 1549. Many women have rebelled against the status quo in
clothing. See BROWNIMLLER, supra note 1, at 91-92.
History is enlivened by a number of women of ambition and talent who chose to mas-
querade in men's clothes, or who wore some essential part of the forbidden costume in
order to work in comfort. Whether it was to take up arms and fight for her country, like
Joan of Arc, to lead escaped slaves through Southern swamps to freedom, like Harriet
Tubman, or to carouse at night in raffish cafes for research and adventure, like George
Sand, a bonnet and a skirt would have imposed a ridiculous bar. They are a fixed
bunch, these purposeful cross-dressers, these illustrious women in serious drag, having
little in common besides a profound need for self-realization and unstoppable courage.
The list includes Rosa Bonheur, who received official permission from the Paris police
to dress in Men's clothes when she went to sketch horses at the slaughterhouse, Calam-
ity Jane, who drove a stage coach in the American West, and the eminent landscape
designer Gertrude Jekyl, who wore army boots and a workman's apron to supervise the
planting on England's great estates.
BRO\WNMILLER, supra note 1, at 91-92.
34. MONA HARRINGTON, WoaaN LAWYERs REawRrrNr THE RULES 182 (1994). I had the
honor of meeting Justice Ginsburg this summer in Cambridge, England, where she was teaching
a two week class on gender discrimination with the assistance of Professor Rosalie Levinson of
Valparaiso University Law School. Despite the demanding schedule of a Supreme Court Justice,
Justice Ginsburg was kind enough to take the time to read this comment, and send me informa-
tion on additional material for research. I would like to thank both Justice Ginsburg and Profes-
sor Levinson for their help with this paper. I would also like to thank Cynthia Harrison, Chief
Historian of the Federal Judicial Office, Patsy Engelhard, Director of the Commission on Wo-
men in the Profession of the ABA, Marena McPherson, Commission on Women in the Profes-
sion of the ABA, Professor Lundy Langston, University of Tulsa College of Law, and Professor
Linda Lacey, University of Tulsa College of Law.
35. Id. at 209.
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Court decision for Sally Reed 36 and began a carefully choreographed
succession of cases that dealt with sex discrimination and gender
equality.37 "Ruth Bader Ginsburg and her cohorts.., argued that
equality under the law should mean gender neutrality .... Their fear
has been that if employers could make any distinction at all between
the sexes, the distinctions would inevitably turn against women. '3 3 In
the end, it is thought that "defining women as a sex-based class for
any purpose invites... invidious stereotyping and discrimination. '39
One year after the Reed decision, another landmark case for gen-
der equality passed through the hands of the Supreme Court.4" In
Frontiero v. Richardson,4 the Court rejected a federal statute which
made it difficult for women to claim their husbands as dependents, but
not for men to claim their wives.42 Justice Brennan wrote, "There can
be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized
by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage."43 Over the years this cage
has changed form, but the substance and the oppression has remained
the same.
III. WOMEN IN TODAY'S WORKPLACE
The "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination" is not
over. Gender bias concerning the capabilities of women and the ap-
propriate images women should project has not halted at the Federal
Court door.' As women litigated about their rights in the 1960s and
36. Id. at 208. Sally Reed, the mother of a deceased child, challenged Idaho state law that
automatically favored the father of a deceased child as the administrator of the estate.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 215.
39. Id. at 183.
40. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Melvin Wulf,
arguing as amicus curiae for the American Civil Liberties Union, urged reversal. Id. at 678.
41. Id
42. Id.
43. Id. at 684. See also Lois GuNDEN CLEMENS, WOMAN LIBERATED 20 (1971).
And so society has been conditioned to believe that women are something less than
men. They are considered to be human beings, but beings of a lower sort, having less
wisdom and intelligence than the male, and lacking in most of his endowed abilities and
capacities. In most parts of the world women have traditionally not had equal opportu-
nities with men to develop their capacities and to become persons of worth in their own
right. They have been prejudged as a class rather than fairly judged as persons. These
myths about women which have been accepted as truth throughout history have been
disproved by the findings of modem science.
Id.
44. See Resnik, supra note 12, at 1684-85.
[Vol. 30:395
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1970s, "they found that some of the pain of discrimination came from
the very places to which they brought claims - courts."'45 In fact, as
late as 1981, a former Wisconsin judge stated that, "women are sex
objects whether they like it or not.'46
A. Impact of Gender Differences on the Legal System
A report conducted by the Federal Courts Study Committee
found that education was the answer to extinguishing and preventing
gender bias in the courts.47 The 1990 report stated:
Studies in many state systems reflect the presence of bias - particu-
larly gender bias - in state judicial proceedings. Although we have
confidence that the quality of the federal bench and the nature of
the federal law keep such problems to a minimum, it is unlikely that
the federal judiciary is totally exempt from instances of this general
social problem. 48
A 1993 article titled Why Women are Leaving the Law, 49 specifi-
cally addressed the problems women face in the "gender gulf" be-
tween men and women in the law. The dichotomy of the sexes
ultimately results in many women abandoning legal careers in search
of a more "gender friendly" occupation. Several studies indicate a
disturbingly high dissatisfaction level among women in legal occupa-
tions.50 In commenting on the male dominance of the profession, one
attorney was quoted as saying, "the legal profession, more than any
other profession I know, runs on testosterone.'
A study conducted in 1986 polled women law graduates from
1975 and 1976, approximately ten years after they had graduated from
law school.5" The findings were similar. The feelings of exclusion due
45. Resnick, supra note 12, at 1684.
46. Whisner, supra note 3, at 119. Archie Simonson made the statement after losing his
recall election. Simonson had been removed from office after saying that an assault, that took
place on a sixteen year old girl, was a result of "influencing environmental factors," including the
woman's clothing. Simonson said that the boy was just reacting normally to the school's sexual
permissiveness. Simonson v. United Press Int'l, 654 F.2d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 1981). "Simonson
then sentenced the delinquent fifteen-year-old to one year at a state reformatory, suspended the
sentence, and directed that the youth participate in a home community treatment program." Id.
47. Resnik, supra note 12, at 1686.
48. Resnik, supra note 12, at 1686.
49. Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 64.
50. Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 66.
51. Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 64.
52. Stacy Caplow & Shira A. Scheindlin, Portrait Of A Lady: the Woman Lawyer in the
1980s, 35 N.Y.L ScH. L. REV. 391, 395 (1990).
1994]
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to gender differentiation are pervasive in female attorneys, and psy-
chologically debilitating. 3 The feeling of exclusion applies to wo-
men's relationships with clients as well as colleagues. 4 Respondents
of the survey stated, "The clients are men. The clients just don't hire
women."55 "It was hard to be taken seriously by clients and partners.
I didn't fit in with all of the... masculine stuff."'56 "The energy spent
struggling with sexism is a major diversion. '57
B. Women as Decorative Objects
Certainly, a gender neutral dress code is not the panacea for the
complex and varied reasons women are disenchanted and disillu-
sioned with the law. However, a dress code that purposely reaffirms
a woman's femininity cannot help but reinforce the sociological and
cultural "differences" of the genders, which results in women feeling
additionally alienated, separated, frustrated, and ultimately inferior.59
Sociologists have described women having to dress "femininely"
and "professionally" as a "deliberately manipulated catch-22 in the
workplace." 6 Sociologist Deborah L. Sheppard stated, "Women per-
ceive themselves and other women to be confronting constantly the
53. Id. at 417-25.
54. Id. at 424.
55, Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
59. Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 64. See also Caplow & Scheindlin, supra note 52. See also
Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and The Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HAS.
TINGs L. 471, 504 (1990).
Despite the strength of criticisms leveled against stereotypical notions of men and wo-
men, the salient point is that these notions are entrenched in the workforce and have
both an internal and an external effect on the achievement and promotion of women.
The task of uprooting and dispelling these stereotypes falls to legislators, employers,
employees, parents, teachers, philosophers, artists, sociologists, lawyers, anthropolo-
gists, and psychologists alike. Feminist legal theorists already have made substantial
contributions toward this project by engaging in a restructuring of legal approaches on
both a practical and theoretical level. While it would be idealistic and naive to assume
that the legal system is the only, or even the most effective, tool available to eradicate
this dangerous form of sexism, there are a variety of incremental ways in which the
legal system can aid in the process of relieving sex stereotypes of their power.
Id.
60. NAoMI WoLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH 42 (1992).
A fifty-four-year-old American woman, quoted in The Sexuality of Organization, said
her boss replaced her one day without warning. He had told her that he wanted to look
at a younger woman so his spirits could be lifted. She said that her age.., had never
bothered her before he mentioned it to her.
Id. (internal quotation omitted). Is it any surprise that, two decades into the legal evolution of
the professional beauty qualification, working women are tense to the point of insanity about
their appearance?
8
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dualistic experience of being 'feminine' and 'businesslike' at the same
time, while they do not perceive men experiencing the same contra-
diction."'" This contradiction has become publicly obvious in the O.J.
Simpson trial concerning the attire of Deputy District Attorney Mar-
cia Clark.6' Clark, who hasn't lost a case in five years,63 was "soft-
ened" in response to a focus group in Phoenix that "convicted Ms.
Clark of the unwomanly crime of abrasiveness."'  Beyond prosecut-
ing O.J. Simpson, Clark must "see if she can hew the fine line between
strong and tough, warm and weak, woman and D.A." These addi-
tional demands upon her have not gone unnoticed. "In the wake of
this, some women are offended that Clark went 'soft.' Others are ap-
palled that she had to."6 However, Superior Court Judge Lance Ito
has failed to take the attire issue that Clark faces seriously.66 When a
prospective juror told Clark that her skirts were too short, the other
attorneys in the courtroom began laughing.67 Ito, instead of control-
ling the courtroom heckling, prompted more laughs when he stated, "I
wondered when someone was going to mention that."6 But that was
not the end of it for Clark. Ito raised the attire issue yet again as the
court broke for lunch saying, "I'm glad we finally got the skirt issue
out in the open."'69 Clark responded, "Speak for yourself."70
Ito may be speaking for himself, but his jovial attitude speaks for
the lack of respect that is given to women in many United States
courtrooms.
71
61. Id.
62. Associated Press, Questions Turn to Skirts, News-leader, Springfield, Mo., Oct. 29, 1994,
at A7.
63. Ellen Goodman, So, What's a Poor Girl to Wear, The Tulsa World, Oct. 21,1994, at N13.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Associated Press, supra note 62, at A7.
67. Associated Press, supra note 62, at A7.
68. Associated Press, supra note 62, at A7.
69. Associated Press, supra note 62, at A7.
70. Associated Press, supra note 62, at A7. "But if you want to know how differently the
style issue plays out for male and female professionals, consider what would have happened if
Marcia Clark had posed for People magazine the way defense attorney Robert Shapiro did.
Without a shirt on." Associated Press, supra note 62, at A7.
71. The Judicial Conference of the United States Courts has adopted Commentary to Ca-
non 3(A)(3) of the ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr (1990) (of which California has
adopted). That commentary states, "[T]he duty to be respectful of others includes the responsi-
bility to avoid comment or behavior that can reasonably be interpreted as manifesting prejudice
or bias towards another on the basis of personal characteristics like.., sex ...." The Final
Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, supra note 7, at 1043 (quoting the Judicial
Conference of the United States, VoL. II, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES,
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE UNITED STATES JUDGES (adopted Sept. 1992)).
1994]
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[E]vidence suggests that the courthouse is a site of particular ten-
sion over female sexuality. Many state court systems, in the late
eighties, published extensive self-studies of gender bias operating in
the courts, including the subjection of women lawyers to sexually
charged attention from male judges, lawyers and court officials.
The 1989 Massachusetts Gender Bias Study, for example, reported
the 64 percent of the women lawyers surveyed had observed male
lawyers, in court, making remarks or jokes that demean women, 43
percent had heard inappropriate comments of a sexual or suggestive
nature, and virtually everyone had heard remarks about the cloth-
ing or physical appearance of women lawyers .... 72
The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force found that "Women in the
courts, including lawyers and clients, are sometimes subjected to
demeaning forms of address, comments on their physical appearance
and clothing, sexist remarks and 'jokes' .... 73 This denial of credi-
bility is "not found by their male counterparts."'74 Most importantly,
for women and their clients "[t]his is a cause for concern because
credibility is directly related to one's ability to influence others. 75
The objectification of a woman attorney in the courtroom directly un-
dermines her effectiveness as an advocate by calling into question her
credibility, while maintaining the credibility of her male counterpart.
Thus, the discrimination affects not only women and their clients, but
the administration of justice, which is the foundation of the law itself.
In The Beauty Myth, author Naomi Wolfe adroitly summarized the
obvious: "If, at work, women were under no more pressure to be dec-
orative than are their well-groomed male peers in lawyer's pinstripe
or banker's gabardine, the pleasure of the workplace might narrow;
but so would a well-tilled field of discrimination. '76
The justification for regulation of women's appearance rests on
two faulty assumptions: (1) women inherently enjoy being decorative
and objectified; and (2) women do not possess the intelligence and
discretion necessary to choose proper business attire.77 Thus, proper
attire must be determined for women by their male superiors.78 The
belief that women enjoy being decorative objects is deeply embedded
in the history of women in general and is rooted in the ownership of
72. MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS REWRITING THE RULES 103 (1994).
73. The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, supra note 7, at 733.
74. The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, supra note 7, at 733.
75. The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, supra note 7, at 733.
76. WoLF, supra note 60, at 45.
77. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979).
78. See id. at 1033 n.17.
[Vol. 30:395
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women as property.79 "The notion of women as male property is ...
at the heart of cultural-social order.""0 In this sense, attire serves a
dual purpose: "it is intended to indicate the social standing of the
woman..., but at the same time it puts feminine narcissism in con-
crete form; it is a uniform and an adornment; by means of it the wo-
man who is deprived of doing anything feels that she expresses what
she is."'" The sentiment involved is her feeling that she is an object
for ownership and exchange by men.
Social custom furthers this tendency to identify herself with her ap-
pearance. A man's clothes, like his body, should indicate his tran-
scendence and not attract attention; for him neither elegance nor
good looks call for his setting himself up as object; moreover, he
does not normally consider his appearance as a reflection of his ego.
Woman, on the contrary, is even required by society to make herself
an erotic object. The purpose of the fashions to which she is en-
slaved is not to reveal her as an independent individual, but rather
to cut her off from her transcendence in order to offer her as prey to
male desires; thus society is not seeking to further her projects but
to thwart them.8
2
The concept of women as decorative objects has persisted even
though women are no longer regarded as the legal property of men.83
For example, a court employee told of a supervisor who forbade
female staff from wearing pants to work, even on days when they
would not be in court and when their judges were not in chambers;
and who told females that they needed to 'dress up' more. The
same supervisor was described as making derogatory comments
about women generally. Another court employee said she disliked
working with a certain male judge because he paid 'too much atten-
tion' to what she was wearing - commenting on color, style, and the
79. Rifkin, supra note 2, at 90-91.
80. Rifkin, supra note 2, at 90.
The nature and meaning of patriarchal social order and of patriarchal culture has re-
cently become the subject of intense scholarly questioning. Historians, literary schol-
ars, political theorists, economists, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and law
teachers have been attempting through their respective disciplines, to understand the
origin of patriarchy and the perpetuation of a patriarchal social order. By patriarchy, I
mean any kind of group organization in which males hold dominant power and deter-
mine what part females shall and shall not play, and in which capabilities assigned to
women are relegated generally to the mystical and aesthetic and excluded from the
practical and political realms, these realms being regarded as separate and mutually
exclusive.
Rifkin, supra note 2, at 83 (citations omitted).
81. DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 4, at 589.
82. DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 4, at 589-90.
83. Whisner, supra note 3, at 76-77.
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like - and he refused to work with female employees unless they
were wearing dresses.r4
It is argued that objectification is self-imposed by women themselves.
Society and the fashion industry have exploited this belief, but as wo-
men are becoming more independent, they are rejecting this
association1 5
That so-called feminine ardor for clothes shopping had been flag-
ging for some time. Between 1980 and 1986, at the same time that
women were buying more houses, cars, restaurant dinners, and
health care services, they were buying fewer pieces of clothing -
from dresses to underwear. The shaky economy played a role, but
mostly women just didn't seem to enjoy clothes shopping as much
anymore. In one poll, more than 80 percent said they hated it,
double from a decade earlier.8 6
In one of the largest studies of women's fashion shopping habits
in the early '80s, Wells Rich Greene found that "the more confident
and independent that women became, the less they cared ... about
their clothes. The agency could find only three groups of women who
were loyal followers of fashion: the very young, the very social, and
the very anxious."'  Yet even Slim Keith,' who was referred to in
1946 as the "Best Dressed Woman in the World," called her title
about as empty as "'Miss Butterfat Week' in Wisconsin. 8 9
C. Employer Restrictions on Choice of Attire
In spite of the questionable premise that women enjoy being dec-
orative objects, many employers have restricted women's individuality
84. The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, supra note 7, at 853.
85. SusAN FAULDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED VAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 170
(1991).
86. Id.
[Mjaybe I'm sick of the masquerade. I'm sick of pretending eternal youth. I'm sick of
belying my own intelligence, my own will, my own sex. I'm sick of peering at the world
through false eyelashes, so everything I see is mixed with the shadow of bought hairs;
I'm sick of weighting my head with a dead mane, unable to move my neck freely, terri-
fied of rain, of wind, of dancing too vigorously in case I sweat into my lacquered curls.
I'm sick of the Powder Room. I'm sick of pretending that some fatuous male's self-
important pronouncements are the objects of my undivided attention, I'm sick of going
to films and plays when someone else wants to, and sick of having no opinions of my
own about either. I'm sick of being a transvestite. I refuse to be a female impersona-
tor. I am a woman, not a castrate.
GREER, supra note 19, at 58.
87. FAULDI, supra note 85, at 174.
88. Slim Keith was at the zenith of society for more than half the twentieth century. She
socialized with the Hearsts, the Paleys, as well as Cary Grant, Gary Cooper, Ernest Hemingway
and Truman Capote. SLIM KEITH AND ANNETTE TAPERT, SLIM 124 (1990).
89. Id.
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and choice of business attire due to the perceived notion that women
prefer to be viewed sexually instead of professionally.' In Carroll v.
Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,9" the plaintiff Mary Carroll,
was required to wear a "career ensemble" as a condition of her em-
ployment. The ensemble was to be worn every business day except
for the "glamour days"92 which were the last Thesday of every month
and two weeks out of the year.93 The dress code for the male employ-
ees, however, merely required "proper business attire." The Court
dismissed Talman's defense that the dress code was reasonably neces-
sary to the operation of its business since other acceptable alternatives
of dressing in business attire were not available. The court held that
the imposition of the dress code was unlawful discrimination.94
Talman attempted to justify its dress code by arguing "that wo-
men cannot be expected to exercise good judgment in choosing busi-
ness apparel, whereas men can." 95
Sexual objectification can be seen in Talman's perception that the
women's sexuality must be muted by uniforms and that the wo-
men's business judgment could not be relied upon to control their
desire to adorn themselves in a sexual way.96
Talman also stated the purpose of the dress code was to avoid the
"dress competition among women," which otherwise only existed on
"glamour days." 97 At oral argument, counsel for Talman stated that,
"the selection of attire, of clothing on the part of women is not a mat-
ter of business judgment."9 He castigated the otherwise intelligent
employees as women "who have excellent business judgment [but]
somehow follow the.., slit skirt fashion.., and they don't seem to
equate that with a matter of business judgment." 99 Ironically, how-
ever, the personnel manager for Talman admitted that when women
were allowed to dress in "appropriate business attire" on "glamour
days" that they never wore "improper attire."'
100
The discrepancy between the assertions of Talman's counsel and
those of the personnel manager can be explained by the ambiguity
90. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1033 n.16.
93. Id. at 1030.
94. Id. at 1033.
95. Id. at 1033 n.17.
96. Whisner, supra note 3, at 88.
97. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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that is found in women's clothes. "[A] woman's ... behavior is no-
ticed and labelled sexual even if it is not intended as such." 10 1 Men
interpret messages in woman's clothing that are non-existent, and thus
leave women vulnerable to harassment and discrimination regardless
of intent.101 Ironically, even without such intent, women feel guilty
for possibly provoking the negative treatment through their choice of
attire. Conversely, women are unable to point to the harassment as
credible, because they are unable to see themselves as credible.10 3
Gender differentiation sustains and preserves patriarchy, the so-
cial structure characterized by systemic power disparities based on
gender.1°4 The New York Task Force on Women in the Courts
concluded:
[G]ender bias against women.., is a pervasive problem with grave
consequences .... Cultural stereotypes of women's role in marriage
and in society daily distort courts' application of substantive law.
Women uniquely, disproportionately and with unacceptable fre-
quency must endure a climate of condensation, indifference and
hostility.'05
Courts that fail to appreciate the significance of these issues and ac-
cept the regulation of women's appearance, to control men's behavior,
thereby legitimate sexual objectification."0 6 Forcing or inducing a wo-
man to conform to dress standards that are not her own and which
purposefully feminize her appearance serve only to subvert her pro-
fessionalism and cripple her emancipation from the chains of
objectification.
101. WOLF, supra note 60, at 43 (citing five studies from THE SEXUALrrY OF OROANIZATnON
1 (JEFF HEARN ET AL EDS., 1989)).
102. WOLF, supra note 60, at 43.
Beauty provokes harassment, the law says, but it looks through men's eyes when decid-
ing what provokes it. A woman employer may find a well-cut European herringbone
twill, wantonly draped over a tautly muscled masculine flank, madly provocative, espe-
cially since it suggests male power and status, which our culture eroticizes. But the law
is unlikely to see good Saville Row tailoring her way if she tells its possessor he must
service her sexually or lose his job.
WOLF, supra note 60, at 45.
103. WOLF, supra note 60, at 45.
104. Whisner, supra note 3, at 119.
105. The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, supra note 7, at 732.
106. The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, supra note 7, at 732.
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IV. APPEARANCE REGULATION AND THE LAW
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from engag-
ing in practices which discriminate upon the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin.'07 Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (1) to
fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or to otherwise
discriminate against any individual, with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2)
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.'08
Title VII was created to give previous victims of employment dis-
crimination equal opportunity in the workplace. The inclusion of gen-
der was accomplished just one day prior to the passage of Title VII by
a floor amendment in the House of Representatives by Howard Smith
of Virginia who was, ironically, a strong opponent of the entire Civil
Rights Act.'09 Originally intended only to affect race and ethnic dis-
crimination, the last minute inclusion of "sex" allowed Congress little
time for debate or broad consideration of its scope.1 0 In fact, some
members of the House feared that the inclusion of "sex" was an at-
tempt to delay or defeat the bill."' The lack of clear Congressional
intent regarding "sex" has been a nemesis of Title VII's application
and has left the courts struggling with its proper interpretation and
scope." 2 Consequently, while the inclusion of gender has undoubt-
edly helped women overcome discrimination, the potential impact was
unfortunately weakened, if not by a premature birth, then at least by
lack of parental planning."'
Employer-imposed grooming regulations and dress code policies
are one type of discrimination that has been challenged under Title
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1988).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
109. Peter F. Ziegler, Note, Employer Dress and Appearance Codes and Ttle VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 46 S. CAL- L. REv. 965, 968 (1973) (citing Robert S. Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimi-
nation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MI4NN. L. REv. 877 (1967)).
110. Md
111. Id.
112. See generally id.
113. If there had been strong legislative history and intent behind the inclusion of "sex" in
Title VII, its application could have been less ambiguous, and the overall impact greater.
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VII with only moderate success. Fagan v. National Cash Register
Co.114 was one of the first cases challenging employer appearance
standards. 115 The plaintiff, who refused to wear his hair above his col-
lar was suspended from his job. He sued under Title VII for sex dis-
crimination. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld the regulation. Referring to a California de-
cision the Court stated:
Making some sense as to claimed discrimination "because of sex"
the court referred to the meager legislative history of the "sex"
amendment. Then the opinion explained the real purpose of the
language. Congress sought to establish equal occupational opportu-
nities, an equal right to available employment, equal pay for equal
work and working conditions. It was not planned that the Act was
[to] be used to interfere in the promulgation and enforcement of the
general rules of employment, deemed essential by an employer,
where the direct economic effect upon the employee was nominal or
non-existent.1 16
In assessing a claim of unlawful sex discrimination courts have
generally applied a two-part test: (1) Is the behavior complained of
unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII;1 17 and, if so, (2) does it
qualify as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).1 18
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wright criticized the decision of
the court in Fagan because National Cash Register's admittedly dis-
criminatory hair policy was never subject to the 703(e) BFOQ analy-
sis.119 He wrote, "By passing Section 703(a), Congress intended to
prevent employers from refusing to hire an individual based on stere-
otyped characterizations of the sexes .... [The] exception to the pro-
hibition ... against sex discrimination in employment is applicable
only to job situations that require specific physical characteristics nec-
essarily possessed by only one sex. 120
However, later that year the court reaffirmed Fagan in Dodge v.
Giant Foods, Inc. 21 Dodge represented another challenge to discrimi-
natory appearance standards based on hair length. The court stated
114. 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
115. See id.
116. Id. at 1123 (citing Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 237-38 (C.D.
Cal. 1972)).
117. Whisner, supra note 3, at 81 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988)).
118. Whisner, supra note 3, at 81 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988)).
119. Fagah v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright,
J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1126-27 (internal citations omitted).
121. 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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that the appearance regulation did not fall within Title VII because
the provision was not allocating employment opportunities un-
equally.122 The court wrote, "We conclude that Title VII never was
intended to encompass sexual classifications having only an insignifi-
cant effect on employment opportunities."'123
Five other districts have followed Fagan and Dodge, but not al-
ways without ambiguity.' 24 In 1971, the Fifth Circuit rejected a hiring
policy that excluded men based on customer preference.25 The em-
ployer was unable to prove that being a female flight attendant quali-
fied as a lawful BFOQ.126 However, several years later, when faced
with an employer hair cut requirement, the same court upheld it as
valid based upon "standards customarily accepted in the business
community."' 27
In Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 28 the Sev-
enth Circuit rejected a dress code which required a uniform for wo-
men, but only appropriate business attire for men. The court
characterized the requirement as "demeaning to women"' 29 and un-
lawful discrimination. Nevertheless, the court gave validity to em-
ployer-sanctioned dress codes that conform to commonly accepted
social norms: "So long as they find some justification in commonly
accepted social norms and are reasonably related to the employer's
business needs, such regulations are not necessarily violations of Title
VII even though the standards prescribed differ somewhat for men
and women.' 3 °
Yet, while approving of "social norms," the court stated that ster-
eotypical assumptions about gender are "anathema to the maturing
state of Title VII.' 31 The district court did not explain, however,
122. Id. at 1336-37.
123. Id.
124. Susan Hillary Loeb, Note, Disparate Dress Codes as Sex Discrimination in Violation of
Title VII, 56 Cm.-KEnr L. REv. 1249, 1259 (1980).
125. Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971).
126. Id. at 387-88.
127. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1975).
128. 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
129. Id. at 1033.
130. Id. at 1032.
131. Id. at 1033 (citing In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582
F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978)). See also Mary Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Wo-
men to Positions of Power, 41 HAsTiNGs L.. 471, 479 (1990) (providing that "'female' or 'femi-
nine' roles and traits are usually the antithesis of the traits thought related to success and
effectiveness. Consequently, feminists have extended the discourse on equality to encompass
the notion that true equality is not currently available for women because male-defined reality
renders women unequal.").
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when a dress code is lawfully based on "social norms," and when the
social norms, themselves, are based on stereotypes.
In La Von Lanigan v. Bartlett,'32 a female employee was dis-
charged for wearing pantsuits in violation of the employer's dress
code. 33 The district court stated that the plaintiff did not establish a
prima facie case of illegal gender discrimination under Title VII, and
thus the employer was not obligated to justify its dress code. 34
The court in EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp.135 reached a different
conclusion by applying a three-part test. After plaintiff Mary Hassel-
man was laid off for refusing to wear sexually provocative uniforms to
work, the EEOC brought suit claiming a Title VII violation. The
Court found the dress code constituted unlawful discrimination be-
cause Sage knew the revealing nature of the uniform would cause the
plaintiff to endure sexual harassment. 36 The Court found that Hassel-
man had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination by show-
ing "first, that as a condition of her employment [she] was required to
wear the ... uniform; second, that Sage ... imposed this condition;
and, third, that but for her womanhood [she] would not have been...
subjected... to sexual harassment."' 37 Under this analysis, it would
seem plausible that any dress code that heightens a woman's potential
to be sexually harassed by objectifying her womanhood would create
a prima facia case of sex discrimination. "[Wiomen tend to be eco-
nomically valued according to men's perceptions of their potential to
be sexually harassed.' '1 38
Sage was a harassment case that involved attire that was overtly
sexual, but the harassment does not always have to be blatant to be
present. "Harassment expresses the conviction that women's basic
identity is in their bodies.' 1 39 Thus, to end harassment in the work-
place, a woman must claim credibility outside gender distinctions and
classifications. But to assert this credibility "is to challenge male
power in all spheres of life. It is to challenge male control of Con-
gress, of the military, of corporate management, of education, and of
132. 446 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
133. Id. at 1390.
134. Id. at 1391.
135. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
136. Id. at 609.
137. Id. at 607-08.
138. Vhisner, supra note 3, at 93 (quoting CATHMRINE A. MAcKINow, SEXUAL HARASS.
MENT OF WORKING WOMEN 23 (1979)).
139. HARRINGTON, supra note 72, at 119.
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all the professions. It is to challenge male control of women's bodies.
It is to challenge male control of the law.'1 40
V. OKLAHOMA FEDERAL COURT DRESS CODES
"Oklahoma is slow to recognize gender issues."'' In 1920, the
19th amendment to the United States Constitution gave women the
right to vote.' 42 However, the proposal to amend Oklahoma's Consti-
tution was not introduced until 1923.4" Oklahoma women were not
given the right to serve on all juries until 1952,144 and Oklahoma was
the last state in the United States to grant women the right to hold
major political office. 45
The 10th Circuit, in which Oklahoma sits, is one of a minority of
circuits that have not created a task force to investigate gender bias in
the courts. 46 Nor has Oklahoma as a state "undertaken an official
effort to sensitize judges and attorneys to gender bias and the serious
effects of what was once acceptable behavior in the courtroom and
professional environment."147 The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task
Force concluded:
Comments on physical appearance are demeaning and put people at
a disadvantage by drawing attention to their gender rather than the
reason for their presence in court. Comments appropriate in a so-
cial setting often are inappropriate in a professional setting. For ex-
ample, complimenting a female attorney on her appearance ....
140. HARRINGTON, supra note 72, at 120.
141. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF OKLAHOaMA, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO OKLAHOMA
COURTS 163 (1994).
142. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX.
143. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 141, at 163.
144. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 141, at 163.
145. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 141, at 163. From 1928 to 1942, the amend-
ment to allow women the right to hold major political office in Oklahoma was pursued. The
amendment was twice rejected; once in 1935 and once in 1940. The amendment was eventually
passed by a 2 to 1 vote in 1942. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 141, at 163.
146. Letter from Cynthia Harrison, Chief, United States Judicial History Office, to Beth
McNamara, Comment Author, Tulsa Law Journal (Nov. 10, 1994) (on file with the Tulsa Law
Journal).
147. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 141, at 159.
In August, 1988, the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court
Administrators called for the creation of task forces in every state to assess and address
gender bias, ethnic, and cultural concerns. Statewide task forces began to assess the
existence of gender bias and its effects on court decisions. By May, 1992, thirty-three
states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, had formed gender bias task forces or
exploration committees to examine the issue.
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 141, at 160-61.
148. The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, supra note 7, at 1050.
1994]
19
McNamara: All Dressed Up with No Place to Go: Gender Bias in Oklahoma Feder
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
In light of the aforementioned, it is not surprising that the Oklahoma
Federal District Courts are the only federal district courts in the
United States with gender biased dress codes. 49
The dress requirements in the local court rules vary from district
to district. The judges in each district are responsible for developing
the local rules of their district, and are allowed additional discretion in
their presiding courtrooms. Oklahoma federal courts are divided into
three districts: Northern, Western and Eastern. 50 Each of these
three districts has its own local court rules. Occasionally within the
local rules, the courts develop a personnel manual that further elabo-
rates on the rules or addresses issues not previously covered.
This comment contains information gathered from a survey of the
twenty judges and magistrate judges in Oklahoma federal courts'-"
concerning their district's dress code, and their own personal opinions
on what constitutes an appropriate dress code.' 2 The opinions were
as varied as the dress codes themselves. 53
A. The Northern District
The author's experience in the Northern District Federal Court
was the inspiration for this paper. 54 The Local Rules of the Northern
District regarding dress state: "Counsel should always be attired in a
proper and dignified manner and should abstain from any apparel or
ornament calculated to attract attention to themselves."'155 The rule in
the personnel manual concerning general attire states, "Female per-
sonnel shall wear dresses, skirts, pants suits, or dress slacks. 1 5 6 How-
ever, the rule concerning courtroom attire states, "Female personnel
149. See discussion infra part V.
150. These courts are located in Thlsa, Oklahoma City, and Muskogee, respectively.
151. Judges responding to the survey include: Judge Alley, Judge Bohanon, Judge Brett,
Judge Cauthron, Judge Cook, Judge Daughtery, Judge Ellison, Judge Leonard, Judge Russell,
Judge Seay, Judge Thompson, Judge West, Magistrate Judge Argo, Magistrate Judge Blasdel,
Magistrate Judge Howland, Magistrate Judge Irwin, Magistrate Judge Payne, Magistrate Judge
Purcell, Magistrate Judge Wagner, and Magistrate Judge Wolfe.
152. See appendix 1.
153. I would like to thank the judges who responded to my survey.
154. The inspiration for this comment came from statements made to me about my attire
(when I was wearing pants), and comments from other personnel lamenting the fact that they
had to keep a dress or skirt on hand at all times in case they were called into court. When one of
my superiors suggested that I should not wear pants in the courtroom, I asked the magistrate for
whom I worked what constituted appropriate courtroom attire. He assured me that pants were
acceptable attire in his courtroom.
155. NORTHERN DismRcr LOCAL RuL.s 83.2(B)(16).
156. UNITED STATES Disr-ucr COURT - THE NORTHERN Dismxicr OF OKLAHOMA, PERSON.
NEL MANUAL, 10-1 (1993).
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attending Court sessions must wear a dress, skirt and blouse, or other
similar business attire.' '1 57
Hence, the women personnel employed by the Northern District
Federal Court are required to wear a skirt or a dress as a condition to
work in the courtroom, even if the rule does not necessarily apply to
female attorneys working in the courtroom. The rule requiring wo-
men personnel to wear dresses or skirts in the courtroom is disturbing
for three reasons. First, not allowing female personnel to wear slacks
in the courtroom because of their gender subjects women to addi-
tional burdens and hazards due to their "sex." Second, purposefully
requiring women personnel to feminize their professional appearance
objectifies them, and perpetuates stereotypes concerning women's
abilities, competence, and credibility.' 58 Third, the requirement that
female courtroom personnel feminize their personal appearance
places unnecessary pressure on female attorneys to conform to the
patriarchal standards of women's attire. 59
The three-pronged test used in Sage to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination 60 can be applied to the female courtroom em-
ployees. If a courtroom employee must wear a dress to perform her
duties as an employee, then the first two prongs are satisfied. If, by
way of the third requirement, she can prove heightened harassment by
being objectified in "feminine" professional attire she may satisfy a
prima facie burden. In its defense, the court would have to show a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for requiring female personnel to
wear skirts and dresses in the courtroom.' 6' If the legitimate reason
involves respect for the formality of the court, 62 then it is clear that
women may achieve that respect through "professional attire" that is
not necessarily "feminine attire." Ultimately, the gender question
should not hinge on demonstrating harassment, but on gender differ-
entiation that results in inequitable treatment. Restricting women
from wearing pants into a courtroom is inequitable treatment and is
exactly the treatment Title VII1 63 was meant to prohibit. A Title VII
157. Id.
158. See Rifkin, supra note 2, at 84-85.
159. See DE BAuvoIR, supra note 4, at 588-95.
160. EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
161. See id. at 608 (holding that "once plaintiffs present evidence sufficient to make their
prima facie showing, the burden of production shifts to defendants to rebut the prima facie case
by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions.").
162. Some survey respondents cited "respect for the formality of the court," ag the inspira-
tion, if not justification, for the dress code. Results from Oklahoma Dress Code Survey (on file
with author).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
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application would not require a showing of harassment, but would re-
quire a showing that the court's dress code intentionally discriminates
between men and women regarding "a term or condition of employ-
ment."'16 Not allowing women to wear pants into the courtroom is a
"term or condition of employment." A court would have to find that
a women can only adequately perform courtroom duties attired in a
dress or skirt for the dress code to be justified by a BFOQ.' 65 If the
dress code cannot be sustained by a valid BFOQ, then it is illegal. 166
B. The Western District
The Western District's local rules do not address or acknowledge
women. The rule regarding appropriate courtroom attire states: "All
male lawyers and male court personnel must wear both coats and
ties."'67 There is no mention of women, and that in itself is puzzling.
If women are feeling alienated and excluded in the law, it may result
from rules that discount an entire gender and reinforce and perpetu-
ate feelings of inferiority and exclusion.
The purposeful exclusion of women in the dress code can be ex-
plained in either of two ways: it is unnecessary because women are
free to dress any way they judge to be professional; or in a profession
dominated by men, women are not worth mentioning. In addressing
the first explanation, it is logical to inquire about the range of wo-
men's apparel worn in the Western District Federal Court. In tele-
phone conversations to court personnel in the Western District, the
answer was unanimous: women only wear dresses. 68 Specifically,
one employee, who had worked in the Western District Court for
nineteen years, reported that he "never once saw a woman wear
slacks in court."'16 9 I asked if a woman had ever attempted to wear
pants to federal court, and he replied, "they just don't do it or I don't
remember them doing it, in my memory I have never seen it.' 70
It is evident that there is a dress code maintained in the Western
District even though it is not explicitly written. The fact that it is not
164. Id.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
166. Id.
167. WEsTERN DISTicr LOCAL COURT RuLE 30(B)(18)(g).
168. Telephone interview with the Operations Manager, Western District Federal Court.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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express, however, makes it no less discriminatory. The silent, unspo-
ken discrimination is often the most invidious. Women who are com-
pelled to dress femininely without the explicit dress code are more
likely to blame themselves for the harassment and sexism because
while their sexuality is expected, its manifestation cannot be con-
cretely pinpointed to a source other than themselves.17 1 A dress code
that acknowledges men, and not women, but nevertheless obligates
women to conform to an unspoken stereotype, confirms their insignif-
icance, subordinance, and questions their legitimacy in a patriarchal
profession.' 72
C. The Eastern District
Of the three federal districts, the Eastern District has the most
explicit and discriminating dress code regulation. 73 The rule, in part,
states: "All female lawyers and female court personnel must wear
dresses or suits."' 74 In telephone conversations with personnel at the
Eastern District Federal Court it was clarified that the word "suit" did
not include "pantsuit." Further, the dress code applies to the court-
room, as well as the workplace in general. In other words, women are
never allowed to wear pants.
Regarding the Eastern District, an analysis such as the one ap-
plied in Sage could be used to show a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. 75 The Eastern District would then have the burden of
presenting "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons" for the dress regu-
lation.176 In essence, the court would have to prove that women can-
not exhibit respect for the formality of the court without feminizing
their professional appearance, and reaffirming their sexuality.177 A
successful Title VII challenge could only be avoided by proving that
the feminization of a woman's appearance is a valid BFOQ and is a
"term or condition of her employment."'o7  This is an insurmountable
obstacle, and as in the Northern District, a Title VII application
171. See WOLF, supra note 60, at 43.
172. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
173. The Eastern District Dress Code prohibits women from wearing pants in the courtroom.
EASTERN DIsTucr LOCAL RULE 30(g).
174. EASTmRN Disinucr LOCAL RuLE 30(g) (stating "[a]ll male lawyers and male court per-
sonnel must wear both coat and ties. Leisure suits are not permissible. All female lawyers and
court personnel must wear dresses or suits"). The Eastern District has proposed an amendment
to Rule 30(g). See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
175. EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
176. Id. at 608.
177. WoLF, supra note 60, at 45.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
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would result in the dress code being found illegal. Justice Jeanne
Coyne, a state Supreme Court Justice, was asked if women judges de-
cide cases differently by virtue of being women?179 She responded
that, "a wise old man and a wise old woman reach the same conclu-
sion."'180 Which is to say, that a professional is a professional, regard-
less of gender identification-regardless of what she wears.
D. The Results
All of the judges who responded to the survey in the Northern
District agreed that women should be allowed to wear pants in the
courtroom. 18' One judge suggested a gender neutral dress standard
that puts the burden on counsel, without reference to the specifics.
The following is an example of such a dress code, "All lawyers and
court personnel must wear appropriate courtroom attire."' 82 The im-
portance was not gender differentiation, but that attorneys treat the
formality of the courtroom with the respect that it is due.18 3
The majority of the responses were from the Western District.
However, of those responding only half offered their opinion as to
whether women should be allowed to wear pants in the courtroom.
Ironically, the only female judge to respond to the survey did not offer
an opinion. However, she did write that she was instigating a project
Jo make the local rules "briefer and more meaningfully organized, and
also to make them gender neutral."''" All of the judges in the West-
ern District who did answer the survey, however, believed that women
should be allowed to wear pants in the courtroom. 8 5 The Eastern
District, which had the most restrictive attire regulation, did not offer
a response or an opinion. 86
179. O'Connor, supra note 15, at 1558.
180. O'Connor, supra note 15, at 1558.
181. All of the judges stated that they would allow women to wear pants in their courtroom,
although one judge specifically excluded jeans. Results from Oklahoma Dress Code Survey (on
file with author).
182. NORTHERN DisTucr LOCAL RULE 30B(19)(h) (superseded on 12/1/93). See UNITED
STATES DIsTmcr COURT - THE NORTHERN DIsRIcr OF OKLAHOMA PERSONNEL MANUAL 10-1.
183. Retaining respect for the court was a major concern for the judges when considering an
appropriate dress code. Results from Oklahoma Dress Code Survey (on file with author).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Susan Brownmiller wrote, "Who said that clothes make a state-
ment? What an understatement that was. Clothes never shut up.
They gabble on endlessly, making their intentional and unintentional
points."'" The law is still a profession steeped in patriarchy."' 8 In
order to compete successfully in the law, a woman must be perceived
to be as competent and as professional as a man. Attire that reflects
both a woman's sexuality and professionalism is a contradiction that
leaves women and men uncertain of a woman's legitimacy. "A skirt,
any skirt, has a feminizing mission .... One is perpetually reminded
to be circumspect when sitting or bending down .... Feminine cloth-
ing has never been designed to be functional, for that would be a con-
tradiction in terms. Functional clothing is a masculine privilege ....
To become truly feminine is to accept the.., restriction and come to
adore it."' 9 But many women never come to adore it.
[W]hy do I persist in not wearing skirts? Because I don't like this
artificial gender distinction. Because I don't wish to start shaving
my legs again. Because I don't want to return to the expense and
aggravation of nylons. Because I will not reacquaint myself with the
discomfort of feminine shoes. Because I am at peace with the free-
dom and comfort of trousers. Because it costs a lot less to wear
nothing but pants. Because I remember how cold I used to feel in
the winter wearing a short skirt and sheer stockings. Because I can
still call to mind the ugly look of splattered rain water on the back
of my exposed legs. Because I can still recall the anguish of an un-
raveled hem. Because I remember resenting the enormous amount
of thinking time I used to pour into superficial upkeep concerns,
and because the nature of feminine dress is superficial in essence-
even my objections seem superficial as I write them down. But that
is the point. To care about feminine fashion, and do it well, is to be
obsessively involved in inconsequential details on a serious basis.
There is no relief. 190
187. BROVNMILLER, supra note 1, at 81.
188. Rifkin, supra note 2, at 95.
189. BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 85-86.
190. BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 81.
Some women have worn men's clothes to accomplish their work. Some women have
worn men's clothes to indicate their temporary or permanent sexual attraction to other
women. Some women have worn men's clothes to experience the power and freedom
of being a man. Some woman have worn men's clothes because they hated their female
bodies. Some women have worn men's clothes because they looked so adorable in
them. Some women have worn men's clothes because they sought an alternative to the
confining clothes they were expected to wear, and expected to delight in, as women.
BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 93-94.
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The intent of this comment is to promote a gender neutral dress
code in the Oklahoma Federal Courts which would allow women
(courtroom employees as well as attorneys) to wear pants into all
three federal district courts; a dress code that mandates "professional-
ism" without "sexism." As the Committee on Professional Ethics of
the New York County Lawyers' Association concluded, "We find it
difficult to see how an appropriately tailored pants outfit could dimin-
ish the order and decorum of the tribunal, affect the rights of the par-
ties or witnesses, or impair the administration of justice." 191
In the end, gender based dress codes that draw attention to the
"femininess" of a female are not helping women blur the lines of sexu-
ality that are already emblazoned in the male dominated legal profes-
sion.192 Legitimizing the "feminization" of women through judicially
sanctioned implicit and explicit appearance regulations demeans and
reduces women to their historical status as incompetent and unprofes-
sional "objects," and obscures the path to true equality for every-
one. 93 As Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace stated as he introduced the
Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force Preliminary Report, "My
strong conviction is that we in the justice system cannot be content
until we have rooted out, as best we can, the effects of bias and preju-
dice based on gender ....
In the process of researching this paper, I contacted the Ameri-
can Bar Association's national headquarters in Chicago.19 After dis-
cussing each of the three local rules with a representative from the
ABA's Women's Commission, the representative stated that she had
"no idea" gender bias dress codes like the ones in Oklahoma Federal
191. The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, supra note 7, at 852.
192. See generally Mansnerus, supra note 6.
193. See Whisner, supra note 3, at 77. See also JOHN MOLLOY, THE WoMAN'S DREsS FOR
SuccEss BOOK 21-22 (1977).
In past centuries and throughout much of this century, women were indeed primarily
considered sex objects. That was partly because men subjugated them and partly be-
cause they let themselves be subjugated. But woman are no longer the cardboard char.
acters that appeared in the early novels of Enlightenment England. They have depth
and personality. They have career goals that they are determined to reach. Neverthe-
less, many women still cling to the conscious or subconscious belief that the only femi-
nine way of competing is to compete as a sex object and that following fashion trends is
one of the best ways to win. It's not.
Id.
194. The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, supra note 7, at 963.
195. Telephone interview with representative from the American Bar Association's commis-
sion on women (April 12, 1994).
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Court "still existed."' 96  Indeed, they don't exist anywhere else.' 97
Only four other federal districts in the entire United States have local
rules that address courtroom attire.19 Regarding these four, one spe-
cifically requires judges to wear judicial robes in court,199 and the
other three were gender neutral.2c ° It is no surprise that the ABA
representative's response to Oklahoma's federal court dress codes was
summarized in one word, "shocking."'20 '
In July, 1994, after delivering a copy of this comment to Supreme
Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a letter was also received from
her chambers stating that Justice Ginsburg was glad to have the infor-
mation regarding this comment before her attendance at the Tenth
Circuit's Judicial Conference.2 2 A subsequent letter was received
from Justice Ginsburg in December, as this Comment was near publi-
cation, summarizing the results of the Tenth Circuit's Judicial Confer-
ence.203 After attending the conference, Justice Ginsburg indicated
that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma has proposed an amendment to Local Rule 30(g) concern-
ing courtroom attire.2' The amendment, signed by Chief Justice
196. Id.
197. The dress codes in the Oklahoma Federal District Courts are the most gender biased in
the country. None of the other districts in the 10th Circuit have a dress code in their local rules
(Wyoming, New Mexico, Colorado, Utah). Perhaps an explicit dress code is not necessary, and
the court should trust the individual to properly attire himself/herself in dignified and profes-
sional clothes. It is arguable that the Northern, Western and Eastern districts should omit a
dress code from their respective local rules.
198. The following courts have rules which discuss attire: the United States District Court
for North Dakota, the United States District Court for Montana, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, and the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.
199. The District Court for Montana requires that judges wear judicial robes in court. Dis-
TRICr COURT FOR MONTANA LOCAL RULE 1002b.
200. The District Court for North Dakota requires, "Persons shall be fully dressed in an
attire to maintain the dignity of the court." DismICr COURT 'OR NORTH DAKOTA RULE 3B4.
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas requires, "Dress with dignity." DisTucr
COURT FOR SoUTHERN DIsTICt OF TEXAS RULE 21, Appendix C. The District Court for the
Northern District of Texas requires, "All persons... shall dress ... in a manner demonstrating
respect for the Court. Each Judge has the discretion to require particular aspects of dress or
conduct that may be appropriate under this rule." DisTRicr COURT FOR NORTHERN DiSTRICr
OF TEXAS RULE 14.1.
201. Telephone interview with representative from the American Bar Association's commis-
sion on women (April 12, 1994).
202. Letter from Linda C. O'Donnell, Secretary to Justice Ginsburg, Supreme Court of the
United States, to Beth McNamara, Comment Author, Tulsa Law Journal (July 29, 1994) (on file
with the Tulsa Law Journal).
203. Letter from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Supreme Court Justice of the United States,
to Beth McNamara, Comment Author, Tulsa Law Journal (November 23, 1994) (on file with the
Tulsa Law Journal).
204. EASTERN DisTRicr LOCAL RULE 30(g) (amended 1994) (amendment, as signed by
Chief Judge Frank H. Seay, on file with the Tulsa Law Journal).
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Frank H. Seay, reads: "[C]ounsel and court personnel should always
be attired in a proper and dignified manner and should abstain from
any apparel or ornament calculated to attract attention to them-
selves. 20 5 This new gender neutral dress code replaces the former
code which stated, in part, "All female lawyers and female court per-
sonnel must wear dresses or suits. 20 6
Although it is hoped that the Northern and Western Districts of
Oklahoma will follow the lead of the Eastern District and adopt gen-
der neutral dress regulations regarding courtroom attire, this com-
ment has proposed and encouraged the elimination of gender bias in
all courts. In addition to "shocking," the dress codes are harmful and
unjustifiable.
[T]he achievement of full equality between the sexes, is one of the
most important, though less acknowledged prerequisites of peace.
The denial of such equality perpetuates an injustice against one-half
of the world's population and promotes in men harmful attitudes
and habits that are carried from the family to the workplace, to
political life, and ultimately to international relations. There are no
grounds, moral, practical, or biological, upon which such denial can
be justified .... 07
New dress codes must be adopted. All Oklahoma federal district
courts must reject dress codes that speak of gender distinctions, and
encourage and support dress codes that speak of gender neutrality. A
woman's prerequisite for access to the United States court rooms
must not be a skirt or a dress; as a citizen of the United States, a
woman must be allowed equal access on equal terms. Justice and the
law require it; respect and dignity demand it.
Bethanne Walz McNamara
205. Id.
206. Former EASTERN DisTRiar LOCAL RULE 30(g).
207. The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, supra note 7, at 731
(emphasis added) (quoting THE PROMISE OF WoRLD PEACE: A STATEMENT By THE UNIVER-
SAL HOUSE OF JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD (Bahai Publishing Trust 1985)).
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APPENDIX 1
DRESs CODE SURVEY
CONCERNING FEMALE EMPLOYEES & LAWYERS
Please check either yes or no. Yes No
1. Would you let a woman wear pants in your
courtroom?
2. Would you require a woman to leave your
courtroom if she were wearing pants?
3. Do you believe requiring women to wear a dress or
skirt serves a valid purpose?
4. If not, do you think the rule should be changed?
5. If so, what is that purpose?
6. Do you think that a navy pantsuit can be as
professional as a pink floral dress?
7. Comments:
(Please attach extra sheets, if necessary)
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